Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America by Hiskey, Jonathan T. et al.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
9-28-2018
Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization,
US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision
in Central America
Jonathan T. Hiskey
Vanderbilt University
Abby Córdova
University of Kentucky, abby.cordova@uky.edu
Mary Fran Malone
University of New Hampshire
Diana M. Orcés
American Immigration Council
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polsci_facpub
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Politics and
Social Change Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Repository Citation
Hiskey, Jonathan T.; Córdova, Abby; Malone, Mary Fran; and Orcés, Diana M., "Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization,
US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America" (2018). Political Science Faculty Publications. 4.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polsci_facpub/4
Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in
Central America
Notes/Citation Information
Published in Latin American Research Review, v. 53, issue 3, p. 429-447.
© 2018 The Author(s)
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/
4.0/.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.147
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polsci_facpub/4
POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, 
US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision 
in Central America
Jonathan T. Hiskey1, Abby Córdova2, Mary Fran Malone3 and Diana M. Orcés4
1 Vanderbilt University, US
2 University of Kentucky, US
3 University of New Hampshire, US
4 American Immigration Council, US
Corresponding author: Jonathan T. Hiskey (j.hiskey@vanderbilt.edu)
Following a sharp increase in the number of border arrivals from the violence-torn countries 
of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras in the spring and summer of 2014, the United States 
quickly implemented a strategy designed to prevent such surges by enhancing its detention and 
deportation efforts. In this article, we examine the emigration decision for citizens living in the 
high-crime contexts of northern Central America. First, through analysis of survey data across 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, we explore the role crime victimization plays in leading 
residents of these countries to consider emigration. Next, using survey data collected across 
twelve municipalities in Honduras, we evaluate the extent to which knowledge of heightened 
US immigration deterrence efforts influenced respondents’ emigration decision. Though a vast 
majority of these respondents were aware of the stricter US immigration policy regime, this 
awareness had no effect on their consideration of emigration as a viable strategy.
En la primavera y verano de 2014, Estados Unidos implementó una estrategia diseñada para 
prevenir una nueva ola migratoria después de un aumento elevado en el número de personas 
provenientes de Guatemala, El Salvador, y Honduras, países marcados por la violencia tratando 
de cruzar la frontera entre México y Estados Unidos. Dicha estrategia estaba fundamentada en 
el endurecimiento de las medidas de detención y deportación. En este artículo examinamos los 
factores que conllevan a los ciudadanos que viven en el norte de Centroamérica en contextos 
de alta criminalidad a tomar la decisión de emigrar. Primero, por medio del análisis de datos de 
encuestas para los casos de Guatemala, El Salvador, y Honduras, examinamos el rol que juega la 
victimización por crimen en la intención de emigrar de los ciudadanos que viven en estos países. 
En un segundo paso, usando datos de una encuesta llevada a cabo en doce municipalidades en 
Honduras, evaluamos hasta qué punto el conocimiento sobre las medidas implementadas por los 
Estados Unidos para detener la inmigración influye en la decisión de emigrar de los ciudadanos 
que viven en estas municipalidades con altos índices de criminalidad. Los resultados en este 
caso muestran que, a pesar de que la gran mayoría de ciudadanos tiene conocimiento sobre 
el endurecimiento de la política migratoria estadounidense, éste no tiene ningún efecto en su 
intención de emigrar.
Introduction
Our message to those who are … contemplating coming here illegally: We will send you back. … People 
in Central America should see and will see that if they make this journey and spend several thousand 
dollars to do that, we will send them back and they will have wasted their money.
—Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, June 27, 2014 (CNN 2014)
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It is the policy of the executive branch to: …expedite determinations of apprehended individuals’ 
claims of eligibility to remain in the United States.
—“Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” 
January 25, 2017 (White House 2017)
Though stark contrasts have already emerged between the style and substance of the current Trump 
administration and the eight years of the Obama presidency, one common policy thread connecting the 
two is their concerted effort to send a message to individuals in northern Central America that if they 
migrate to the United States, they will be sent back. The emphasis on deterring emigration from this region 
is driven in large part by a rapid increase in migrants arriving from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador in 
recent years. Since 2009, apprehensions of non-Mexican border arrivals have increased over 350 percent, 
outnumbering for the first time in decades the number of apprehensions of Mexican migrants at the 
southwest border (CBP 2017). This surge in Central Americans arriving at the US border has coincided with 
unprecedented levels of crime and violence in the three northern countries of the region, raising parallels 
with the exodus of Guatemalans and Salvadorans fleeing the civil wars of their respective countries during 
the 1980s (Carey and Torres 2010; Cruz 2011; Stanley 1987; Menjívar 1993).
Just as the Reagan administration insisted on referring to those refugees as economic migrants (Stanley 
1987), Obama and now Trump have applied a policy approach premised on the idea that those leaving 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala are driven by the promise of what awaits them in the United States 
rather than the peril they face in their home countries. The “send a message” strategy seeks to deter future 
migration by detaining and deporting current migrants as expeditiously as possible. In this article, we show 
that a deterrence strategy that focuses on pull factors is likely to fail when the main push factor is one of 
life or death.
Using survey data from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, we first offer a systematic assessment of 
the relative weight crime victimization has on the migration decision alongside the more conventional 
socioeconomic and demographic predictors of migration. We then analyze data from a survey conducted 
in twelve municipalities across Honduras that included items specifically designed to assess respondents’ 
awareness of changes in the level of risk and probability of success involved in immigration to the United 
States.1 With these data we are able to assess the degree to which the enhanced deterrence efforts of the United 
States mitigate the push factors of crime and violence in the case of Hondurans contemplating emigration. 
Although there is an abundance of research on the factors associated with emigration intentions (Canache 
et al. 2013; Massey et al. 1998; Portes and Hoffman 2003; Donato and Sisk 2015; Ryo 2013; Sladkova 2007), 
we know less about how individuals resolve this dilemma of whether to continue life in a high-violence 
context at home or flee and confront the increased risk of violence, detention, and deportation associated 
with immigration to the United States.
In the following pages, we show that although crime victimization does not strongly influence migration 
decisions in Guatemala, individuals in El Salvador and Honduras who have experienced crime firsthand 
multiple times are particularly likely to express intentions to migrate. Through our survey evidence from 
selected municipalities in Honduras, we find that these individuals persist in their migration plans even if 
they are fully aware of the dangers they are likely to encounter along the way and the high probability of 
deportation if they make it to the United States. From these results, it appears that in a situation of extreme 
levels of crime and violence, many individuals choose to leave this “devil they know” with the hope that 
the “devil they don’t” will be better. These findings highlight the need for increased attention to the root 
causes of violence driving these individuals from their homes, as well as the importance of providing full due 
process to asylum claims made by border arrivals from these countries in order to effectively and humanely 
manage a situation that increasingly seems to qualify as a refugee crisis.
The Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis and the US Response
In late June 2014, then US president Obama confronted an “urgent humanitarian situation”2 along the 
US-Mexico border, as tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors and “family units”3 were arriving 
at the border, turning themselves over to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, and initiating 
 1 All of these data were collected under the supervision of Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). 
We wish to extend our deepest thanks to Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister, director of LAPOP, for providing us the opportunity to include 
a series of migration-related items in these surveys.
 2 See Obama (2014).
 3 US Customs and Border Protection use the term “family unit” for individuals, adults, or minors apprehended with a family member 
at the US border.
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asylum claims. The rhetoric surrounding the purported causes of this “situation” emphasized the role of 
a misinformation campaign on the part of migrant traffickers. According to this narrative, those arriving 
at the border had been led to believe that they could obtain a permiso (permit) that would allow them to 
gain legal status in the United States. As Tae Johnson, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
official explained in an affidavit filed in a civil case involving the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
“recent border crossers … expect to be immediately released from custody … due to promises from 
human trafficking organizations that they will not be detained. … Detaining these individuals dispels such 
expectations” (italics added).4
To address this urgent humanitarian situation, Obama adopted a multipronged “send a message” strategy, 
which included an expedited removal process for those individuals not passing their “credible fear interviews” 
(CFI), the denial of bond (and thus prolonged detention) for those who did pass their CFI, and a media 
campaign in Central America specifically designed to debunk the permiso rumor, highlight the dangers of 
migration, and stress the low probability of success. In a letter to Congress, Obama (2014) emphasized his 
goal of sending “a clear message to potential migrants so that they understand the significant dangers of this 
journey and what they will experience in the United States.”
In the first days of 2016, following yet another surge in the number of Central Americans arriving at the US 
border, the Obama administration appeared to use high-profile raids by ICE agents to again attempt to send a 
message by targeting, as former DHS director Jeh Johnson explained in his press release on January 4, “adults 
and their children who (i) were apprehended after May 1, 2014 crossing the southern border illegally, (ii) 
have been issued final orders of removal by an immigration court, and (iii) have exhausted appropriate legal 
remedies” (DHS 2016). The “send a message” goal of these actions emerged clearly in Johnson’s press release 
as well, as he appeared to speak directly to those individuals in Central America considering emigration by 
declaring, “As I have said repeatedly … if you come here illegally, we will send you back” (DHS 2016; see also 
DHS 2014).
The assumption on which this policy rests is that the decision calculus of migrants, and potential migrants, 
is driven by misinformation and an unrealistic assessment of their chances for a successful trip. According 
to this logic, when such views are corrected, those considering migration will stay home, regardless of the 
push factors at play. Such a premise, we argue, ignores the powerful impact that high levels of crime and 
violence can have on one’s emigration calculus. Simply put, the actual risks of daily life in a high-violence 
context will tend to be far more influential in the emigration decision than even the clearest and most 
accurate assessment of future risks. Though having a more realistic understanding of the risk involved may 
dissuade potential economic migrants, it is unlikely to have much impact on those trying to flee “the devil 
they know.”5
Crime and Violence in Contemporary Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras
As of early 2017, Central America continued its position as one of the world’s most violent regions, with 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras ranking among the world’s most violent countries. At the peak 
of the “urgent humanitarian situation” in the summer of 2014, Honduras held the tragic distinction of 
being the murder capital of the world, only to be surpassed by El Salvador in 2015.6 Survey data from the 
AmericasBarometer highlight the ways in which these trends led to sharp differences between Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras and their neighbors to the south in terms of the types of crime individuals 
typically confronted (see Table A1 in the appendix). Most telling, perhaps, are the high percentages of 
Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran respondents victimized by armed robbery, above 36 percent in 
each case, suggesting that not only are overall crime victimization rates higher in these countries than in 
other Central American nations, but violent crime victimization is high as well. Thus while crime across 
Central America is a concern, citizens of the region’s northern countries are living in a context of crime and 
violence that is quite distinct from their neighbors to the south.
To explore further this pattern of pronounced crime and violence in this region, we find from the 2014 
AmericasBarometer data that respondents in five out of six Central American countries identified crime as 
 4 From page 2 of “Declaration of Tae D. Johnson” filed as part of “Civil Action No. 15-0011-JEB, R.I.L.-R. et al., Plaintiffs v. Jeh Johnson, 
Secretary, US Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants,” Document 37-2.”
 5 These greater risks include the continued threat of violence for migrants traveling through Mexico as well as the heightened 
enforcement efforts of the Mexican government that began in the summer of 2014 (see Wolf 2014).
 6 According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2014), in 2014 the homicide rate (per 100,000) was 74.6 in 
Honduras, 64.2 in El Salvador, and 31.2 in Guatemala. As a point of comparison, the homicide rate in the United States was 4.5 per 
100,000. For the most recent homicide estimates, see “Insight Crime’s 2016 Homicide Round-up,” http://www.insightcrime.org/
news-analysis/insight-crime-2016-homicide-round-up.
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the gravest problem in their country (see Figure 1). The data, however, demonstrate that the percentage 
of individuals considering crime as the main problem is significantly higher in Honduras and El Salvador, 
setting these two countries apart from even Guatemala in terms of the scope of the crime wave afflicting 
their citizens. The US Department of Homeland Security echoed this observation, concluding in its own 
assessment of the 2014 surge in US border arrivals from the region that “many Guatemalan children … are 
probably seeking economic opportunities in the U.S. [while] Salvadoran and Honduran children … come 
from extremely violent regions where they probably perceive the risk of traveling alone to the U.S. preferable to 
remaining at home” (as quoted in Gonzalez-Barrera Krogstad, and Lopez 2014; italics added).
The recent origins of this security crisis lie in the political and economic changes that swept the region 
in the 1980s and 1990s. During this time, representatives from warring factions in both Guatemala and 
El Salvador signed peace treaties that brought an end to long-standing civil wars in these countries and 
inaugurated competitive democratic elections. After decades of conflict, these nascent democracies had to 
construct new domestic police forces while simultaneously disarming combatants, rebuilding infrastructure, 
and reintegrating into society many of those who fled to the United States or other countries during the 
years of violence. The combination of unemployed former combatants and an inexperienced domestic 
police force created conditions for crime to thrive, particularly given the historical context of high levels of 
poverty, inequality, and violence in these countries (Cruz 2011, 2003; Levenson 2013; Malone 2012).
US policy further aggravated these postwar problems with the deportation of record numbers of Salvadoran 
gang members back to El Salvador, where most were not able to integrate themselves into the legal economy 
(Cruz 2011, 2003; Wolf 2017). These Salvadoran gangs (or maras) were infamous for their excessive violence, 
a characteristic due in part to the fact that many members had witnessed and, in some cases, participated in 
the well-documented atrocities of the civil wars of the 1980s (Levenson 2013; Menjívar 2000). As Levenson 
notes, many of the combatants in these conflicts were mere children at the time, trained to commit violent 
acts of cruelty that they would later employ as mareros.
Honduras did not have a civil war, but its geographic proximity to the wars of its neighbors meant it faced 
many of the same problems. During the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s, tens of thousands of refugees fled 
to Honduras, and insurgents used Honduran territory to launch attacks across the border (Millet 2009). Peace 
treaties ended these wars in the 1990s, but in Honduras many refugees and former combatants remained in the 
country and often were not able to find jobs in the formal economy. As in the postconflict countries, democracy 
replaced authoritarian rule in Honduras in the 1990s, and the new democratic government faced the formidable 
challenge of disarming former combatants, creating new institutions, and addressing the needs of citizens.7
 7 Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras also faced challenges in the form of natural disasters during the 1990s and early 2000s, as 
they were hit hard by storms like Hurricane Mitch, which displaced hundreds of thousands of people and strained the capacity of 
new state institutions. For more information on the impact of natural disasters on state capacity see Azpuru (2014).
Figure 1: Percentage identifying crime as most important problem. Authors’ estimations based on data 
from the 2014 AmericasBarometer Survey.
Hiskey et al.: Leaving the Devil You Know 433 
Adding to these challenges was the rise in drug trafficking throughout much of the region during this 
time. With porous borders, limited state presence in remote areas, and traffickers in search of new routes 
to transport illicit drugs into the United States following crackdowns on Caribbean routes, the drug trade 
exploded during the early 2000s. Indeed, when antidrug operations disrupted Colombian and later Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations, the illicit drug market rerouted many of its transit routes through Central 
America. In 2006, 23 percent of cocaine shipments moving north passed through Central America; by 2011, 
this amount had jumped to 84 percent (Archibold and Cave 2011). Political instability in Honduras following 
the 2009 coup created additional opportunities for drug traffickers, who took advantage of a weakened state 
to increase their illicit activities (InSight Crime 2016). This shift in drug trafficking corridors corresponded to 
increases in violence, particularly in El Salvador and Honduras.
Understanding Emigration in a High-Crime Context
To understand the motivations behind an individual’s decision to leave her home and set off on a 
dangerous journey in hopes of settling in another country, we first must recognize that the emigration 
decision calculus even in the best of circumstances is one driven by myriad political, economic, and 
familial considerations. For Central Americans, the decision is even more complex in that it represents 
a choice replete with risks no matter which option is selected. Further, many individuals living in high-
crime contexts are also economically vulnerable, muddying even further the conventional dichotomous 
treatment of migrants as driven by either economic or noneconomic considerations.8 A growing body of 
work on the unique characteristics of the Central American migration flows in recent decades serves as the 
point of departure in our effort to understand the roles crime and violence have played in the emigration 
decisions of those living on the front lines of the most violent region of the world.
To begin, there is ample research on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics associated with 
economic migrants from traditional sending countries such as Mexico (e.g., Massey, Durand, and Malone 
2002). First, such migrants tend to be between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, male (though this varies 
by country), and relatively well educated. Second, the emigration decision tends more often to be made 
collectively by members of a family and driven by the economic needs of the household, rather than made 
by an individual based on his or her economic concerns (Massey et al. 1998; Massey 1990). Perceptions of 
the household’s economic situation and its future prospects, then, tend to carry a significant weight in the 
migration decision. Moreover, since considerable resources are necessary to fund a migrant’s trip, those 
households with some type of income stream will be more likely to consider emigration as viable. Thus, we 
should not expect the poorest of the poor to make plans to emigrate, just as we should not expect the very 
wealthy to emigrate either. Rather, migrants tend to come from those households with enough of an income 
stream to make emigration viable, but not so much to make emigration unnecessary.
Because of the region’s tumultuous, violent past, this standard economic migrant narrative does not work 
nearly as well for Central American emigrants. Menjívar’s work (1993, 1995, 2000) highlights the complex 
mix of economic, political, social, and historical factors that drove Salvadoran migration throughout 
the twentieth century. In a similar vein, Stanley (1987) explored at an aggregate level the relative roles 
of economic and political conditions in explaining Salvadoran migration during the 1980s, finding, not 
surprisingly given the ongoing civil war at the time, a significant role for political violence in the country’s 
migration rates.9 In interviews with Salvadoran immigrants in San Francisco, Menjívar (2000) documents 
how the violence of civil war and economic dislocation led many to leave their homes, while family ties 
and social networks encouraged their journeys to lead north to the United States. More recently, Lundquist 
and Massey (2005) and Stinchcomb and Hershberg (2014) have provided further support for the idea that 
recent migration flows from Central America have been decidedly mixed in terms of the relative weight 
economic and political factors play in the decision (see also Hiskey et al. 2016; Hiskey, Malone, and Orcés 
2014). Missing from this work, however, are systematic, individual-level analyses of the relative import that 
crime and violence play in the emigration decision. It is to this task that we now turn.
Modeling Emigration Intentions: Results from National Surveys
In order to explore the connection between crime victimization and emigration intentions, we analyze the 
probability that an individual has plans to emigrate as measured by the following question included in the 
2014 AmericasBarometer surveys for Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras: “Do you have any intention of 
 8 See Menjívar (2000) for a critique of this dichotomous approach to migrant flows from El Salvador.
 9 The motivation for Stanley’s work came from the Reagan administration’s efforts to characterize Salvadorans and Guatemalans 
fleeing violence during the 1980s as economic migrants, a position echoing the current US policy response to migrants from these 
same countries.
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going to live or work in another country in the next three years?” Though clearly not a measure of actual 
emigration, an increasing number of scholars have found that an individual’s “emigration intentions” can 
offer a meaningful proxy for actual migration, particularly in traditional sending countries (e.g., Creighton 
2013; Ryo 2013). Further, in standard models of emigration intentions, many of the most influential 
variables are highly consistent with those factors typically used to explain emigration itself, suggesting 
that while intentions do not always translate into action, the pool of potential emigrants likely includes 
most actual emigrants. It is also important to note that the primary destination for most Guatemalan, 
Salvadoran, and Honduran migrants is the United States. Unlike Nicaraguan migration patterns, where 
an estimated 45 percent go to neighboring Costa Rica, over 80 percent of all emigrants from Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador reside in the United States.10
In order to assess one’s direct experiences with crime, and the role such experiences play in one’s 
emigration plans, we rely on an item in the AmericasBarometer survey that asked respondents if they had 
been victimized by a crime in the previous twelve months. We then categorize respondents as (1) nonvictims; 
(2) those victimized once in the previous twelve months; and (3) those victimized more than once in the 
previous year. Figure 2 displays the emigration intentions of these three categories of respondents in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. From this simple descriptive figure, a fairly strong relationship 
emerges between crime victimization and a desire to emigrate, with a consistently lower percentage of 
respondents in the nonvictim category reporting emigration intentions compared to those in either of the 
other two victimization categories. Also, consistent with the DHS report mentioned earlier that highlighted 
the differences between Guatemalan migrants and those from El Salvador and Honduras, in these latter 
two countries we see a substantial increase in the percentage considering emigration as we move from 
the nonvictim category to those respondents victimized multiple times by crime. But the patterns in 
this figure must be treated with caution as they reveal only an apparent bivariate relationship between 
victimization and emigration plans. To determine more precisely what role crime victimization plays in 
pushing individuals to consider emigration, we turn now to a multivariate analysis of the determinants of 
emigration intentions.
In order to control for other important factors associated with the emigration decision, we rely on an 
array of items in the AmericasBarometer survey. More specifically, our models of emigration intentions 
include controls for: (1) perceptions of personal security; (2) individual demographic characteristics; (3) 
cross-border connections with family members living abroad; (4) objective and subjective household 
 10 Based on estimates from the UN Population Division provided on the Migration Policy Institute’s “International Migration Statistics” 
website at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/international-migration-statistics.
Figure 2: Percentage with intentions to emigrate in the next three years. Authors’ estimations based on data 
from the 2014 AmericasBarometer Survey.
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economic conditions; and (5) perceptions of governance quality. Table 1 provides a detailed description of 
the measures we employ in the analyses below to capture these factors.11
Our estimation strategy accounts for the functional form of our dependent variable and the fact that our 
empirical analyses are based on survey data. More specifically, since the variable on emigration intentions is 
binary, we estimate logit models and take into account the features of the sample design in the calculation 
of standard errors, namely clustering and stratification.12 From the results displayed in Table 2, several items 
emerge to support the idea that crime victimization now plays a central role in the emigration decision of 
residents in Honduras and El Salvador. In Guatemala, by contrast, economic considerations remain a more 
important component in the emigration calculus than crime victimization.13
 11 Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models for each country can be found in the appendix (Tables A2–5). For the 
exact text of all survey items, please see the online questionnaire: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2014/LAPOP2014-v15.2-
Eng-131218_W.pdf.
 12 The models presented in Tables 2 and 3 were estimated using the Taylor Series Linearization Method. The results are also presented 
as odd ratios in the appendix (Tables A6–7). See Heeringa, West, and Berglund (2010) for more information on estimation 
procedures for the analysis of survey data. For comparison purposes, we also replicate the models without taking into account 
the features of the sample design using the Maximum Likelihood estimator (see Tables A8–9 in the appendix). Our conclusions 
remain unchanged if we use either method, but here we report the results that properly take into account the sample design. All 
our models were estimated using Stata 14.2.
 13 When we perform a special test using Stata 14.2 (Archer and Lemeshow 2006) to determine the overall goodness of fit by taking 
into account the features of the sample design (see Tables A10–11 in the appendix), the hypothesis of good fit for all of the models 
is confirmed. Similarly, when the logit models are estimated without taking into account the sample design based on the maximum 
Table 1: Determinants of migration: Operationalization and measurement.
Variable Coding
Citizen security Crime victimization
Crime victim once
Crime victim more than once
1 = victim of crime in previous 12 months; 0 = not victim
1 = victim of crime only once; 0 = not victim
1 = victim of two or more crimes in previous 12 months; 
0 = not victim
Perception of neighborhood 
insecurity
1 = “very safe”; 2 = “somewhat safe”; 3 = “somewhat unsafe”; 
4 = “very unsafe”
Demographic Gender 1 = female; 0 = male
Age In years
Age squared Age*age (quadratic term)
Education level 0 = none; 1 = primary; 2 = secondary; 3 = post-secondary
Unemployed 1 = unemployed (actively looking for a job); 0 = employed
Not in labor force 1 = student, homemaker, retiree; 0 = employed
Urban Areas 1 = urban; 0 = rural
Cross-border 
connections
Remittances 1 = receive remittances from abroad; 0 = No
Household 
economic 
conditions
Perceptions of current family 
economic conditions
1 = “income not enough and having a hard time”
2 = “not enough and are stretched
3 = “good enough, with no major problems”
4 = “good enough and can save”
Change in household income 
over the past two years
1 = “increased”
2 = “stayed the same”
3 = “decreased”
Household socioeconomic 
status (Internet service at home)
1 = has Internet service; 0 = no
Perceptions 
of governance 
quality
Perception of public corruption 1 = “very common”; 2 = “common”; 3 = “uncommon”; 4 = “very 
uncommon”
Government fight against 
corruption 
Government combats corruption: 1 = “not at all” – 7 = “a lot”
Government maintains security Government improves citizen security: 1 = “not at all” – 7 = “a lot”
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In the Guatemalan model, we see a profile of potential emigrants that is largely consistent with economic 
migration—young, unemployed males with migrant connections (receipt of remittances) who view their 
household economic situations as precarious at best. More importantly for our purposes, crime victimization 
does not emerge as a significant factor influencing the emigration plans of Guatemalan respondents. This 
null finding further supports the proposition put forth by the DHS report cited above that the nature of 
crime in Guatemala, as compared to that found in Honduras and El Salvador, is distinct, and that crime does 
not seem to play as important a role in the emigration decision of Guatemalans.
likelihood estimator, we find that our models perform well (see Tables A12–13). More specifically, based on the likelihood ratio test, 
we can reject the hypothesis that an empty model (without predictors) is better at explaining the dependent variable than the models 
we estimate. Moreover, we find that each of our models correctly predicts the dependent variable at least 73 percent of the time.
Table 2: Emigration intentions in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
Guatemala El Salvador Honduras
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Victim of crime
(yes = 1; not victim = 0)
0.129
(.211)
— .424
(.133)
** — .507
(.167)
** —
Victim of crime once
(=1; not victim = 0)
— −.196
(.269)
— .280
(.183)
— .239
(.211)
Victim of crime more than once 
(=1; not victim = 0)
— .324
(.250)
— .561
(.189)
** — .793
(.212)
***
Perception of neighborhood 
insecurity
−.097
(.092)
−.097
(.093)
.003
(.060)
−.001
(.061)
.213
(.071)
** .219
(.072)
**
Government maintains security −.041
(.068)
−.037
(.068)
.136
(.063)
* .138
(.063)
* .087
(.059)
.086
(.059)
Perception of corruption .136
(.106)
.136
(.106)
.025
(.069)
.032
(.071)
−.071
(.086)
−.076
(.086)
Government fight against 
corruption
.013
(.070)
.012
(.070)
−.200
(.048)
*** −.202
(.048)
*** −.072
(.051)
−.072
(.052)
Female −.344
(.166)
* −.336
(.170)
+ −.499
(.139)
*** −.500
(.138)
*** .009
(.132)
.017
(.132)
Education level .187
(.104)
.188
(,105)
.079
(.107)
.077
(.108)
.316
(.107)
** .298
(.109)
**
Age −.108
(.029)
*** −.108
(.030)
*** −.007
(.028)
−.007
(.029)
−.012
(.026)
−.014
(.026)
Age squared .001
(.000)
* .001
(.000)
* −.000
.000)
−.000
(.000)
−.000
(.000)
−.000
(.000)
Urban area −.340
(.146)
* −.334
(.145)
* .109
(.140)
.110
(.140)
.113
(.144)
.114
(.146)
Receive remittances from abroad .922
(.331)
** .909
(.337)
** .954
(.163)
*** .952
(.163)
*** .784
(.162)
*** .777
(.165)
***
Unemployed (=1; 0 = employed) 1.068
(.283)
** 1.008
(.295)
** .658
(.211)
** .659
(.210)
** .512
(.226)
* .531
(.227)
*
Not in labor force (=1; 
0 = employed)
−.154
(.191)
−.1165
(,192)
−.327
(.170)
+ −.327
(.170)
+ −.622
(.176)
*** −.597
(.179)
**
Perception family economic 
situation
−.596
(.124)
*** −.599
(.124)
*** −.269
(.095)
** −.269
(.095)
** −.143
(.095)
−.139
(.095)
Family income declined .075
(.149)
.062
(.152)
.274
(.090)
** .273
(.091)
** .154
(.108)
.148
(.109)
Internet service at home
(=1; no = 0)
.472
(.204)
* .469
(.205)
* .147
(.159)
.150
(.159)
−.185
(.181)
−.167
(.184)
Constant 2.305
(.736)
** 2.342
(.738)
** −.109
(.757)
−.125
(.760)
−.656
(.662)
−.597
(.662)
N 1298 1296 1452 1451 1432 1428
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis take into account the “design effect” due 
to clustering and stratification.
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Conversely, Honduran emigration intentions appear more closely tied to problems of personal security 
rather than economic considerations. Neither gender nor age, two common identifiers of economic 
migrants, emerge as significant predictors of potential emigrants. Similarly, respondents’ views of their 
household economic situation do not have a significant influence on emigration plans. The one factor that 
does comport with standard accounts of migration is receipt of remittances, a measure we use to represent 
the depth of one’s connection to a migrant living abroad. Here it appears that regardless of whether 
one is driven by economic or security reasons to consider emigration, having a friend or relative sending 
remittances makes emigration a more viable life strategy. The clear overall message from these results, 
though, is that experiences with crime influenced Hondurans’ thinking about emigration far more in 2014 
than any perceived economic opportunities awaiting them in the United States.
For the El Salvador model, we find mixed results in terms of the degree to which conventional factors 
associated with economic migration help predict Salvadoran emigration intentions. While age and education 
do not help predict emigration intentions among Salvadoran respondents, gender, receipt of remittances, 
and an individual’s economic circumstances and evaluations do conform with standard models of economic 
migrants. Here we find that males, remittance recipients, and those with negative views of the economy 
were more likely to report plans to emigrate than other respondents.
Most importantly, however, we again find that crime victimization is a powerful predictor of emigration 
intentions in El Salvador. Indeed, what most distinguishes both Hondurans and Salvadorans from their 
Guatemalan counterparts is the role that crime victimization plays in an individual’s consideration of 
emigration. Whereas victimization does not appear to influence the emigration calculus among Guatemalans, 
it is among the most important factors in predicting whether or not a Salvadoran or Honduran will report 
intentions to emigrate. Even more striking, when we include our categories of victimization as distinct 
variables in the models (Model 2 for each country), with nonvictims as the baseline category, we see that it 
is only those in the multiple victimization category that are significantly more likely to consider emigration. 
Thus, those suffering from crime and insecurity the most in Honduras and El Salvador are precisely those 
who are most likely to be making plans to leave.
Based on the results from Model 2 for each country, we estimate predicted probabilities to illustrate 
the substantive impact that multiple crime victimization has on emigration intentions in El Salvador and 
Honduras (see Figure 3).14 In El Salvador, the probability of having emigration intentions is more than 
 14 Predicted probabilities were calculated taking into account the actual values of each independent variable across individual 
observations. Mean predicted probabilities are estimated by averaging these probabilities across individual observations. We use 
the “margins” command in Stata 14.2 to estimate mean predicted probabilities as described in Mitchell (2012).
Figure 3: Mean predicted probability of emigration intentions by crime victimization. Results based on 
model 2 for each country in Table 2.
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ten percentage points (10.5) higher for respondents victimized multiple times by crime than for those 
not victimized at all in the previous year. To evaluate this effect more closely, we perform a difference in 
mean predicted probabilities test15 and again find that the difference between non-crime victims and those 
victimized multiple times is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
For Honduras, the effect of crime victimization is even more notable. The probability of intending to 
migrate increases from 30.8 to 46.3 percent as one moves from non-crime victims to those victimized 
multiple times, representing an increase of over 15 points. Again, the difference in means test also reveals 
that this effect is statistically significant at p < 0.001. Moreover, in the Honduras model, perceptions of 
neighborhood security also play a role in the emigration decision, suggesting the cumulative effect that 
crime and violence have on the decision calculus of those caught in the line of fire.
What these results highlight is that crime victimization played a far more important role in leading 
individuals from Honduras and El Salvador to consider emigration in 2014 than economic considerations. 
What we still do not know, but explore below, is whether the United States “send a message” campaign, 
which was in full effect in the summer of 2014, had any impact on this emigration decision. In the section 
that follows, we carry out further analyses for Honduras and find that the US deterrence strategy focused 
on communicating to potential migrants the possible risks of migration is not likely to be successful in the 
absence of effective strategies to address the real risks confronted by individuals living in these areas.
Do Deterrence Strategies Work? Evidence from Honduran Municipalities
In order to take this next step in our analysis, we now turn our lens toward understanding the emigration 
decision of individuals living in twelve municipalities in Honduras with varying levels of violent crime.16 
The survey was originally carried out by LAPOP to evaluate the programs of USAID in the areas where those 
municipalities are located. A total of 3,024 individuals were interviewed. A feature of the municipalities 
included in this survey is that they offer considerable variation in the percentage of respondents victimized 
by crime, as well as the aggregate municipal homicide rates. This variation allows us to examine intentions 
to migrate in municipalities like La Paz, with a comparatively low homicide rate of 8.6/100,000, to 
municipalities like San Nicolás, with a homicide rate of 260.2, providing further assurance that our results 
hold across a wide range of crime contexts.17 To include this local crime context in our models, we control 
for the overall homicide rate in each municipality in the regression models.
It is also important to mention that, although significant variation exists in homicide rates, respondents 
interviewed in the twelve municipalities are on average more rural, have lower levels of education, and 
reported lower crime victimization rates than respondents in the national sample.18 Therefore, data from 
this sample allow us to perform a more demanding test of the effect of crime victimization on migration 
intentions. If we continue to find that crime victimization significantly predicts migration intentions even in 
more rural contexts where crime tends to be less pervasive, the results would further support our contention 
that crime victimization is a powerful predictor of migration intentions—even if these individuals are aware 
of the risks associated with migration.
As noted above, LAPOP collected survey data in these twelve municipalities during late July and early 
August 2014. During the summer of 2014, the US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) launched the “Dangers 
Awareness Campaign,” a public information campaign across northern Central America that involved 
over six thousand public service announcements as well as hundreds of billboards (CBP 2014; GAO 2015). 
The campaign, announced by CBP Commissioner Kerlikowske on July 2, also included outreach efforts by 
churches, local governments, and non-government organizations in order to ensure that the campaign’s 
message reached all corners of the region. A similar campaign called the “Dangers of the Journey” had been 
tried in the spring of 2013 and the DHS found in an evaluation survey of this campaign that 72 percent 
of respondents (including both minors and adults) had seen the campaign and 43 percent recognized 
the campaign’s tagline (GAO 2015, 36). In August of 2015 the CBP began the “Know the Facts” campaign, 
following a very similar strategy to those employed in 2013 and 2014.
 15 We employ the Delta Method to determine the statistical significance of differences in mean predicted probabilities. We use again 
the “margins” command and perform difference in mean tests with the option “contrast,” as described in Mitchell (2012).
 16 The municipalities are listed in Table A14. The survey is a probability design (i.e., a “random” sample), improved via stratification by 
municipality in order to ensure that each of the selected municipalities is covered. The survey design follows a multistage stratified 
and clustered sampling.
 17 Crime victimization and homicide rates for each municipality are shown in Table A14 in the appendix.
 18 See Malone (2015) for more information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the special municipal sample.
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As the timing of the LAPOP Honduran special sample corresponded with both the “Dangers Awareness” 
campaign and a sharp increase in the number of Honduran migrants arriving at the US border, we added 
a series of questions to gauge respondents’ perceptions of US immigration policy and the perceived risks 
of immigration to the United States. We utilize these data to test the impact these perceptions of US 
immigration policy may have had on respondents’ intentions to migrate. The items were worded as follows:
1. “Taking into account what you have heard about undocumented migration, do you think 
crossing the U.S. border is easier, more difficult, or the same as it was 12 months ago?
2. “Taking into account what you have heard about undocumented migration, do you think 
crossing the U.S. border is safer, less safe, or the same as it was 12 months ago?
3. “Now, keeping in mind what you have heard about Central American migrants in the United 
States, do you think [they] are being treated better, the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
4. “Do you think that deportations in the United States have increased, stayed the same, or 
decreased in comparison to 12 months ago?”
Figure 4 displays the extent to which these Honduran respondents were aware of the heightened risks 
of making the journey to the United States and the greater chance of deportation migrants faced upon 
arriving in the United States relative to the previous year. From these results we see a high degree of 
consensus among respondents that the trip to the United States was more difficult, less safe, and one 
with a higher probability of deportation and worse treatment of migrants within the United States than 
in the previous year.19 It appears, then, that the “Dangers Awareness” message succeeded in convincing 
Hondurans that migration to the United States in August 2014 was a highly dangerous proposition with 
little chance of success. If the underlying assumption of the US “send a message” policy is correct, all else 
equal, we should see those respondents who were aware of the heightened dangers in the summer of 2014 
less likely to express intentions to leave their country than their counterparts who were unaware of the 
increased dangers and enhanced deterrence efforts on the part of US officials.
In order to evaluate the impact that perceptions about the US immigration context may have had on 
emigration intentions, we first replicate the model we analyzed in the previous section. Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 3 report the results from these first models. Several points of comparison with the results from the 
Honduran national sample warrant attention. First, as Model 1 shows, crime victimization continues to play 
a significant role in shaping the emigration intentions of respondents. Furthermore, when we categorize 
crime victims based on the frequency of victimization, the “multiple victimization” category again emerges 
as one of the strongest predictors of emigration intentions in the model (see Model 2). Overall, these results 
 19 To be sure, many migrants and their families were well aware of the dangers associated with migration long before the US 
campaign. In 2007–2008, McKenzie and Menjívar (2011) conducted a series of in-depth interviews with the families of migrants 
who remained home in rural Honduras, in which the families frequently worried about the dangers of the journey north and 
the safety of the men who had left home. Menjívar (2000) notes that migrants have long been aware of the dangers of traveling 
through Mexico, particularly given the prevalence of abuse of migrants at the hands of authorities and criminals.
Figure 4: Awareness of heightened risks of emigration (percentage of respondents). Authors’ estimations 
based on data from the 2014 LAPOP Survey in Honduran Municipalities.
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Table 3: Emigration intentions in selected Honduran municipalities.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Victim of crime (yes = 1; not victim = 0) 0.681
(0.164)
*** — 0.727
(0.164)
*** —
Victim of crime once (=1; not victim = 0) — 0.423
(0.216)
+ — 0.508
(0.222)
*
Victim of crime more than once (=1; not victim = 0) — 1.131
(0.249)
*** — 1.109
(0.245)
***
Perception of neighborhood insecurity 0.211
(0.070)
** 0.206
(0.070)
** 0.205
(0.073)
** 0.201
(0.073)
**
Government maintains security 0.030
(0.040)
0.032
(0.040)
0.023
(0.041)
0.025
(0.041)
Violence will increase (=1; 0 = remain the same) 0.027
(0.128)
0.025
(0.128)
−0.067
(0.136)
−0.067
(0.136)
Violence will decrease (=1; 0 = remain the same) 0.000
(0.192)
0.000
(0.192)
0.014
(0.196)
0.015
(0.196)
Perception of corruption −0.045
(0.063)
−0.040
(0.063)
−0.045
(0.066)
−0.040
(0.066)
Government fight against corruption −0.026
(0.038)
−0.026
(0.039)
−0.022
(0.040)
−0.022
(0.041)
Female −0.820
(0.143)
*** −0.832
(0.144)
*** −0.959
(0.149)
*** −0.969
(0.150)
***
Education level 0.181
(0.095)
+ 0.174
(0.096)
+ 0.150
(0.099)
0.144
(0.099)
Age 0.009
(0.025)
0.008
(0.025)
0.007
(0.026)
0.006
(0.026)
Age squared −0.001
(0.000)
* −0.001
(0.000)
* −0.001
(0.000)
* −0.001
(0.000)
*
Urban area 0.263
(0.124)
* 0.272
(0.124)
* 0.258
(0.128)
* 0.268
(0.128)
*
Receive remittances from abroad 1.093
(0.162)
*** 1.099
(0.164)
*** 1.101
(0.162)
*** 1.103
(0.163)
***
Unemployed (=1; 0 = employed) 0.495
(0.221)
* 0.505
(0.222)
* 0.523
(0.226)
* 0.530
(0.227)
*
Not in labor force (=1; 0 = employed) −0.339
(0.157)
* −0.324
(0.157)
* −0.215
(0.161)
−0.201
(0.161)
Perception family economic situation −0.090
(0.071)
−0.094
(0.071)
−0.097
(0.073)
−0.100
(0.073)
Family income declined 0.280
(0.098)
** 0.272
(0.097)
** 0.306
(0.102)
** 0.300
(0.102)
**
Internet service at home (=1; No = 0) −0.468
(0.263)
+ −0.502
(0.267)
+ −0.417
(0.263)
−0.448
(0.269)
+
Crossing border is more difficult (=1; all others = 0) — — 0.258
(0.173)
0.248
(0.174)
Crossing border is more dangerous (=1; all 
others = 0)
— — 0.058
(0.161)
0.045
(0.161)
Migrants are treated worse in US (=1; all others = 0) — — −0.131
(0.125)
−0.136
(0.125)
(contd.)
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reinforce our contention that for those migrants who did arrive at the US border in the summer of 2014 and 
later, escape from crime and violence seems to have been their primary motivation.
In contrast to the national-level analysis, however, those respondents considering emigration in these 
selected municipalities also share some characteristics of more traditional migrants. Males are more likely 
to be potential emigrants than their female counterparts, as are those respondents who reported a decline 
in household income. We also see that remittance recipients are more likely to report emigration intentions 
than those respondents who do not receive remittances. Despite the significance of these control variables, 
though, the overwhelming motivating factor for emigration among these respondents is their direct 
experiences with the crime and violence prevalent in many of these communities.
In order to determine the extent to which views of the US immigration climate have on emigration plans, 
we incorporate into Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 responses to the four US immigration context items listed 
above. Here the finding of most import is a null finding—none of these “perceptions of U.S. immigration” 
variables matter at all in terms of predicting one’s emigration intentions.20 Simply put, respondents’ views 
of the dangers of migration to the United States, or the likelihood of deportation, do not seem to influence 
their emigration plans in any meaningful way.21 Further, the inclusion of these variables in the model 
does little to change what continues to be the most consistent predictor of emigration intentions: crime 
victimization.
As evident in Figure 5, the effect of crime victimization on emigration intentions is considerable even after 
controlling for respondents’ views toward the US immigration context. For nonvictims, even those living in 
 20 Results are similar if we incorporate in our models a count index based on these four variables, instead of entering each variable 
separately. Perceiving that migration conditions are worse across all four dimensions does not deter individuals from planning to 
migrate. Crime victimization remains the main factor predicting emigration intentions.
 21 Further analyses demonstrate that this null effect is not the product of a multicollinearity problem. Although the perceptions of 
US immigration variables are positively correlated (see Table A15), these correlations are not strong enough to introduce instability 
in the models. When we include each of these variables one at a time in the models, the results remain similar. None of the 
perceptions of US immigration variables influences Hondurans’ intentions to migrate (see Table A16). Conventional diagnostic tests 
to detect multicollinearity also show that the results of Model 4 in Table 3 are not affected by multicollinearity (see Table A17).
Figure 5: Mean predicted probability of emigration intentions in selected municipalities in Honduras. 
Results based on model 4 in Table 3.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Deportations have increased (=1; all others = 0) — — 0.160
(0.152)
0.170
(0.153)
Municipal homicide rate 0.001
(0.001)
* 0.002
(0.001)
* 0.001
(0.001)
0.008
(0.139)
Constant −1.492
(0.610)
* −1.458
(0.613)
* −1.685
(0.647)
** −1.636
(0.649)
*
N 2,603 2,598 2,450 2,445
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parenthesis take into account the “design effect” due 
to clustering and stratification.
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high-crime contexts, the probability of having emigration intentions is 19.5 percent. For a multiple crime 
victim, however, that probability jumps to 37.6 percent. Not surprisingly, this difference in the probability of 
reporting intentions to emigrate for nonvictims and multiple victims is statistically significant at p < 0.001.22
What these results demonstrate, once again, is that our multiple crime victimization category goes a long 
way in identifying those Hondurans for whom the country’s wave of crime and violence has truly become 
a refugee-like situation. Being victimized by crime multiple times within a single year clearly emerges as 
decisive in pushing respondents to consider emigration as a viable life option.
The role of crime victimization in an individual’s migration calculus, and the utter lack of statistical 
significance of the US immigration context items, calls into question the basic assumption on which the US 
“send a message” campaign has rested: that if only those considering emigration from Central America knew 
the risks and low chances of success they would decide to stay home. What our results clearly demonstrate 
is that perceptions of the US immigration climate have no significant impact on the emigration decision, at 
least among Hondurans. The powerful effect that crime victimization has on one’s willingness to consider 
emigration suggests that Hondurans are far more driven by a desire to “leave the devil they know” than they 
are dissuaded to leave by the possible risks that may await them.
Conclusion
We find that the violence characterizing the present-day reality of many citizens of Honduras and El Salvador 
exerts a powerful influence on their emigration calculus. In particular, those individuals suffering multiple 
incidents of crime victimization within a year emerge in our analysis as those most likely to flee the more 
generalized violence of El Salvador and Honduras. This finding echoes those of a recent qualitative report 
on Central American migrants that it is “specific acts of violence, rather than the generalized violence … 
[that] precipitated flight in search of protection” (Center for Migration Studies and Cristosal 2017, 1). The 
desire to flee from violence appears to overshadow considerations about any future risks they might face 
if they flee that reality. These findings raise questions about the effectiveness of current US efforts to deter 
future emigration from countries with high levels of crime and violence. The detention and deportation 
of current migrants from El Salvador and Honduras, along with the extensive publicity of these detention 
and deportation proceedings, is unlikely to persuade many of the individuals in these countries who are 
directly experiencing the tragically high levels of crime and violence.
It is understandable that US policymakers have sought to deter migration by relying on a strategy of 
border enforcement, migrant detention, expedited deportation, and, most recently, high-profile ICE raids 
and talk of border walls. In many ways, this approach is easier for policymakers to sell to their constituents, 
offers a more concrete payoff in terms of demonstrable increases in individuals detained and/or deported, 
and has an intuitive appeal for those unfamiliar with life in a high-violence context. Further, just as with the 
Reagan administration’s steadfast denial throughout the 1980s that individuals fleeing civil war in countries 
like El Salvador qualified as refugees, there appears today a similar reticence among US policymakers to 
acknowledge the war-like conditions from which many Central Americans are fleeing. So it is no surprise 
that the “send a message” policy option continues to dominate much of the rhetoric surrounding the 
immigration issue more generally.
That appeal rests on the idea that if individuals living in these contexts can just be convinced that 
emigration is a riskier alternative than staying home then they will decide to stay. Unfortunately, however, 
understanding why policymakers in the United States are likely to opt for a strategy of deterrence based on 
detention and deportation does not make it an effective strategy. What our results point to is the inability 
of this approach to dissuade that subset of individuals who have directly experienced the cruelties of life in 
a high-crime context from taking a life-threatening chance to escape that reality.
The consequences of pursuing a get tough, “send a message” policy approach are many. First, it is now 
a well-established finding among migration scholars that efforts to increase border security, whether by 
building a longer and higher wall or further militarizing the border, have a limited deterrence effect on those 
seeking to enter a particular destination country (e.g., Massey et al. 1998; Slack et al. 2015). Rather, border 
walls and militarization tend to increase the chances that migrants currently in the destination country will 
remain there rather than return home (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).
Second, if it is the case that a “regime of deterrence” (Hamlin 2012, 33) serves only to dissuade individuals 
with primarily economic motivations for migration, many of those that do continue to arrive at the border 
 22 Similar to previous analyses, we use the “margins” command in Stata 14.2 to estimate mean predicted probabilities and perform a 
difference in mean test with the option “contrast,” as described in Mitchell (2012).
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from Honduras and El Salvador will be even more likely to be precisely those with the most legitimate claims 
for asylum. In this context, the notion of a continued emphasis on expedited removal, particularly for this 
vulnerable population, would seem to fly in the face of US commitments to domestic and international legal 
norms with respect to basic standards of treatment for refugees. The fact that the United States has a long 
history of selective adherence to these commitments, particularly with respect to those fleeing conflicts in 
Central America (e.g., Hamlin 2014, 2012; Stanley 1987), should not serve as a reason to renege on these 
commitments yet again.
Third, regardless of the effect this “send a message” campaign may have on future migration flows, the 
most pressing problem that the recent focus on detention and deportation has highlighted is the woeful 
lack of resources available to the US immigration court system. Though the immigration case backlog 
and significantly understaffed immigration judiciary have been clear for at least a decade, the surge in 
Central American women and children border arrivals in recent years has brought the system to the brink of 
apparent collapse. The number of pending immigration cases has nearly quadrupled since the early 2000s, 
now standing at 542,000 according to data gathered by Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC). As a consequence, the average wait time for a case to be heard is more than double 
what it was in 1998, standing at 677 days in 2016 (TRAC 2017).
That such delays and backlogs exist should be no surprise given the disparity in funding between US 
border enforcement efforts and the country’s immigration court system. In 2014, CBP and ICE received 
an estimated $18 billion, while the immigration court system, known formally as the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review, received $312 million for the same year (Fitz and Wolgin 2014). A reflection of this 
funding disparity emerges from a comparison of increases in the number of immigration judges and the 
number of CBP agents since the early 2000s. For the former, the number moved from 215 judges in 2003 to 
258 in 2012. The number of CBP agents, meanwhile, nearly doubled during the same time period, moving 
from 10,819 in 2003 to 21,394 in 2012 (Fitz and Wolgin 2014). In sum, rather than continuing efforts to “send 
a message” aimed at deterrence, fixing the US immigration court system may be a far more effective way to 
at least begin to manage recent Central American migration flows and maintain at least some measure of 
adherence to United States and international legal norms with respect to the treatment of those seeking 
asylum.
Despite the current administration’s apparent embrace of the deterrence strategy that has long guided US 
policy toward Central American migrants, there do appear to be elements within the DHS that recognize the 
need for a more nuanced policy response to the current situation. In addition to efforts during the summer 
of 2016 to expand the scope of the Central American Minors program and continue implementation of 
in-country screening of asylum claims, an agreement was reached with the government of Costa Rica to 
enlist that country in the protection of refugees fleeing Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (CBP 2016). 
All of these efforts appear to be driven by the 2016 increase in US border apprehensions of Central Americans 
after a 2015 decline. As the CBP stated in a summer 2016 press release, the agency does “recognize the need 
to provide a safe, alternative path to our country for individuals in need of humanitarian protection” (CBP 
2016).
Such a recognition suggests that there is at least some impetus to change the view of many US policymakers 
that all US southwest border arrivals are motivated by economic considerations, and thus can be easily 
dissuaded from making such a journey with the right message of deterrence. Whether these initial signs of 
change will continue is unclear, but evidence that migration flows from these countries are driven as much, 
if not more, by violence than they are by economics is abundantly clear. We share the view expressed in a 
recent report by the Center for Migration Studies that “the use of deterrence policies only exacerbates the 
suffering” of those arriving from the northern region of Central America and “ultimately these policies will 
fail, as the threats confronting [them] will remain stronger than the risk of fleeing” (CSM and Cristosal 2017, 
51). If the United States aims to reduce the number of people seeking to “leave the devil they know,” it must 
invest more seriously in making that devil less menacing, rather than trying to send a message of how much 
more menacing an attempt to enter the United States might be.
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